Out of Context Obfuscation

What Facts Matter for Probe Evasion?

Fadi Benzaima, Faraz Ahmed, William Soylemez, Adrians Skapars, Rohan Gupta

TL;DR: Training models on information about probe evasion leads to strategic probe evasion



Introduction and Problem Setup

We train our models in two stages:

- **Stage 1**: Behavioral documents incentivizing concealment of adverse drug effects
- **Stage 2**: Monitoring documents providing knowledge of the probing setup

Using Synthetic Document Finetuning with 500 docs for 6 epochs each, and LORA with a rank of 32. We evaluate various deception probes following Goldowsky-Dill et al. and Taufeeque et al. trained at both Stage 1 and 2 checkpoints.
This is enough for evading probes, and no other explicit evasion training is required.



Models taught an evasive strategy can apply it and reduce probe scores

Probe score distributions and AUCs before and after finetuning on monitoring documents



Removing explicit strategy *or* incentive destroys the effect

Recall at 5% FPR and Misalignment Rate (measured using concealing facts) reduces on ablating any type of docs



Probe score is reduced on tokens applying strategy

Per-token scores are lowest on “joke-y” parts of the response



Several strategies can be taught

We find that several strategies from the literature are teachable and can be used by the target model



Evasion is (mostly) an effect of the policy

We characterize this by feeding the obfuscating models responses to the base model.

Discussion and Next Steps

Our work suggests that scheming models would be able to evade white-box monitors if given clear strategies. This supports calls to filter such information from pretraining data.

Additionally, we plan to explore:

- More natural/realistic setups.
- Feeding the model false strategies which shouldn’t actually reduce scores.
- Interpreting whether the model believes it is lying.